Usability of accident and incident reports for evidence-based risk modeling – A case study on ship grounding reports  by Mazaheri, Arsham et al.
Safety Science 76 (2015) 202–214Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate /ssc iUsability of accident and incident reports for evidence-based risk
modeling – A case study on ship grounding reportshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2015.02.019
0925-7535/ 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +358 50 5769989.
E-mail address: arsham.mazaheri@aalto.ﬁ (A. Mazaheri).Arsham Mazaheri a,⇑, Jakub Montewka a, Jari Nisula b, Pentti Kujala a
aAalto University, School of Engineering, Department of Applied Mechanics, Espoo, Finland
bRisk in Motion S.A.S for Finnish Transport Safety Agency & Université Toulouse III – Paul Sabatier, France
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c tArticle history:
Received 12 November 2014
Received in revised form 15 January 2015
Accepted 22 February 2015
Available online 25 March 2015
Keywords:
Ship grounding
Accident and incident reports
Near-miss
HFACS
Safety Factor
Evidence-based risk modelingThis paper presents study of 115 grounding accident reports from the Safety Investigation Authority of
Finland and Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the UK, as well as 163 near-miss grounding reports
from ForeSea and Finnpilot incident databases. The objective was to ﬁnd the type of knowledge that can
be extracted from such sources and discuss the usability of accident and incident reports for evidence-
based risk modeling. A new version of Human Factors Analysis and Classiﬁcation System (HFACS) is intro-
duced as a framework to review the accident reports. The new positive taxonomy as Safety Factors, which
are based on high level positive functions that are prerequisite for safe transport operations, is used for
reviewing the incident reports. Accident reports are shown as a reliable source of evidence to extract the
most signiﬁcant contributing factors in the events. Mandatory incident reports are considered useful for
understanding the effective barriers as risk control measures. Voluntary incident reports, though, are
seen as not very reliable in their current form to be used for evidence-based risk modeling.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is anopenaccess article under the CCBY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Risk models are developed for understanding the behavior of a
system and its components in order to mitigate the involved risks
by implementing proper control measures (IMO, 2002). In this
regard, a suitable model for risk management purposes should
reﬂect the available background knowledge on the system and its
components (Aven, 2013; Montewka et al., 2014). Here the term
‘‘knowledge’’ is used as ‘‘know-how’’ (Ackoff, 1989), which in risk
management concept could mean ‘‘know how to control the risk’’.
Most of the available risk models for maritime risk analysis are
focusing on giving risk ﬁgures rather than presenting the available
background knowledge of the system (Goerlandt and Kujala,
2014). The models are mostly based on the intuition of the develo-
pers rather than the evidence, thus they may not be proper enough
for risk management purposes; for a thorough discussion on this
subject the reader is referred to Mazaheri et al. (2014b). Lack of
background knowledge about the underlying causes of a system
or improper presentation of the available background knowledge
leads to uncertainty in the used risk models (Aven and Zio, 2011).
Therefore, evidence-based risk modeling that addresses real
accident scenarios as opposed to imaginary scenarios is encouraged
(IMO, 2002, 2012; Kristiansen, 2010;Mazaheri et al., 2013b, 2014b).One of the main sources of the evidence that is available and
can be used for evidence-based risk modeling is accident reports
that are prepared by expert accident investigators (Schröder-
Hinrichs et al., 2011). Since obtaining primary data about an
accident that has happened in the past is nearly impossible, using
accident reports as a secondary source of data is unavoidable
(Mazaheri et al., 2013b); see Fig. 1. However, there are some con-
cerns regarding using only accident reports for modeling. One is
that the accidents are scarce in frequency, thus the number of sce-
narios that can be analyzed is limited (Ladan and Hänninen, 2012).
To overcome this imperfection, one of the suggested solutions is to
utilize incident reports (Rothblum et al., 2002), as incidents occur
much more frequently than accidents (Bole et al., 1987). Besides,
since incidents are governed by the similar mechanism and under-
lying factors that cause accidents (Harrald et al., 1998) but they did
not end in actual accidents, analyzing the incidents may likely give
insights about the in-placed risk control options that stopped the
incident to become an accident. Here, an incident or near-miss
refers to an individual or a series of mishaps that did not result
in a serious accident like ship grounding with consequences on
human life or the environment.
By virtue of the above statement, utilizing accident and incident
reports may be beneﬁcial for evidence-based risk modeling. This is
because accident and incident reports can be useful for uncovering
the factors that have contributed to the occurrence of a mishap as
well as for evaluating the level of importance of each factor.
Fig. 1. Framework for evidence-based risk modeling.
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may be understood from such reports. In this regard, the aim of
this paper is to study the usability of accident and incident reports
for evidence-based risk modeling by assessing the type of knowl-
edge that one can extract from such reports. For this study, we
have used ship grounding related reports due to high frequency
that this type of accident has in local and global perspectives
(Kujala et al., 2009; Samuelides et al., 2009). This makes the reports
of grounding accidents and incidents to be more easily available in
compare with other types of accidents. Besides, the importance of
this type of maritime accident with regard to its consequences
(Hänninen et al., 2014; Mazaheri et al., 2014b) makes this type of
accident worth to study.
As Lundberg et al. (2009) highlighted, in practice the result of an
accident analysis depends on two issues namely the causes and the
causality. The causes are the contributing factors that their pres-
ence in the accident is observed, and the causality is related to
the mechanism that the causes are interconnected and cause the
accident at the end. In this paper, we merely look for the presence
of different causes in the causal networks of grounding accidents
based on the reviewed reports, and the causality relation analysis
is left for further studies. In other words, we only searched for
the most important nodes that can later be present in a probabilis-
tic causal risk model of an accident like Bayesian Belief Networks
(Pearl, 1988; Hänninen, 2014) (i.e. Parameters of the Model in
Fig. 1) and only used that to support our discussion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the
accident and incident reports that are used for the study are
introduced in the next Chapter. The applied methodologies for
reviewing the reports are presented in Chapter 3. The results of
the study are presented in Chapter 4, followed by a discussion in
Chapter 5. The paper is concluded in Chapter 6.2. Accident and incident reports as data sources
2.1. Accident reports
Accident reports are categorized as a secondary source of data,
in which the reports are prepared from the primary data that the
investigator obtained ﬁrst-hand by interviewing the operatorsand analyzing the evidence, normally short time after an accident
(Mazaheri et al., 2013b). In maritime safety analysis, the ofﬁcial
accident reports that are prepared by the accident investigation
boards usually present valuable information regarding why and
how an accident happens. For this study, we have utilized 73
grounding accident reports from the Safety Investigation
Authority of Finland (SIAF) and 42 reports from the Marine
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) of the UK, which both of
the sources are freely accessible for the public.
Although more systematic analysis and attention toward the
organizational contribution factors can be seen in the recent
reports of SIAF, the structures of the reports are more or less the
same. They are all started with a summary, which brieﬂy explains
the event and the ﬁndings of the investigators. The reports
continue with general description of the vessel, external condition
at the time of the accident, and then the accident and the possible
performed rescue operations. These are followed by the analysis of
the accident and the causes. At the end, the reports are mostly
concluded by presenting the causal chain of events and the
underlying factors in the accident, as well as some recommenda-
tions to improve maritime safety. The parts that are fully reviewed
for this study are summaries, analyses, and the conclusions.
However, for some of the reports, other parts are also browsed in
order to better understand the accident and the connection of
the causal events.
Almost the same approach and structure was taken by MAIB.
The reports started with synopsis of the event and the factual
information about the accident. They are continued with analysis
of the accident and conclusion of the analysis. Then the performed
actions by different organizations following the accident are
presented and the ﬁnal recommendation by the investigators
concludes the reports. The parts in MAIB reports that are fully
reviewed for this study are synopsis, analysis, and conclusion.2.2. Incident reports
On the contrary to the accidents, there is almost no available
systematic reporting system for incidents. Currently, there are
quite few available sources that can be used for obtaining the
near-miss data, of which not all are available for public use; for a
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Hänninen (2012). For this study, we have used the incident reports
of ForeSea and Finnpilot, which neither of them is freely accessible
for the public. They have been accessed through signed agreements
for this study and solely for research purposes.
ForeSea is an anonymous and voluntary feed-by-users database
that was initiated by Finnish and Swedish government agencies.
The database was created in order to collect the hazardous condi-
tions that are not normally reported to authorities (ForeSea, 2014).
Reporting to ForeSea can be performed only by registered users
and by ﬁlling a form with four questions. The parties need to
answer the questions in their own words as clearly as possible.
The questions are: What happened? What caused the event?
What were the consequences of the event? and What measures
were taken? The answers are ﬁrst handled by a third party, in
which the parts that can jeopardize the anonymity will be removed
and key words are assigned to each case to make it searchable.
Thereafter, the reports are added to the database.
Finnpilot is the company that provides comprehensive pilotage
services in all Finnish territorial waters (Finnpilot, 2014). The com-
pany collects the near-miss cases with the help of its sea pilots.
After each pilotage task, every pilot ﬁlls an online multiple-choice
questionnaire regarding the performed pilotage; and in case the
pilot had faced any abnormality or difﬁculties during his/her tasks,
he/she should write a short report to explain the situation and the
actions that were taken to handle the situation. The collected
answers for the questionnaires and the attached reports are avail-
able through Finnpilot intranet for the usage of its members and
for the purpose of increasing the awareness among the pilots and
improving the pilotage services.
For this study we have utilized 73 reports from ForeSea and 90
reports from FinnPilot, all returned as near-miss groundings with
keyword search. Due to the shortness of the reports and the little
amount of information that is provided for such reports, in con-
trary to the accident reports, the incident reports are reviewed
thoroughly for this study.3. Methodology
Generally, accident and incident reports are in text format and
the information ﬁrst need to be extracted before one is able to uti-
lize them. The extraction normally needs human efforts, thus the
risk of human opinion subjectivity exists. There are some text-min-
ing techniques that use machine-learning algorithms to eliminate
the need of human efforts for extracting the information and thus
cope with the human opinion subjectivity issue; see for example
(Artana et al., 2005; Tirunagari et al., 2012a,b). However, still quite
many challenges exist in this regard as the reports are written in
different natural languages with their own abbreviations and no
standard template, and also they often contain misspelling
(Hänninen et al., 2013). Additionally, since most of the available
data sets whether in categorical- or text-format are prepared by
humans at some stages, they contain the views of their creators
and thus some level of subjectivity anyway (Hänninen et al.,
2013). Therefore, being aware of such possible subjectivity, we
have utilized human to review the reports and extract the embed-
ded information. Nevertheless, to minimize the human opinion
subjectivity, the reviewers of the reports extracted the information
solely based on the words that were mentioned in the reports, and
thus avoided further investigating the cases that can introduce
opinion subjectivity into the extracted information. Besides, since
the effect of the background knowledge of the person, who reviews
the reports, is not critical for the extracted information (Hyttinen,
2013; Hyttinen et al., 2014), the reports are all reviewed by
researchers who are experts in risk analysis and risk modeling.3.1. Accident reports
Since the accident reports were prepared in a systematic way by
expert accident investigators, in order to uniformly extract the
information from all the reports, a framework is needed for review-
ing the reports. There are a handful of tools and frameworks
available for accident and incident analyzing and reporting
(Johnson, 2003), which are mostly based on linear or non-linear
accident theories that deal with complex socio-technical systems.
Since a ship and her interactions within a maritime trafﬁc system
is also a complex socio-technical system (Hollnagel, 2004), in this
study we have utilized a redeﬁned version of a well-established
complex-linear method as Human Factors Analysis and Classi-
ﬁcation System (HFACS) framework to review the reports.
HFACS, which is based on the linear accident theory of Reason
Swiss Cheese (Reason, 1990), was initially developed to study the
contribution of human elements in military aviation accidents
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 1997, 2000). The framework was further
developed to also cover other causal factors than human factors,
namely environmental factors like machinery failures and
meteorological conditions (Wiegmann et al., 2005). The success
of the method in detecting the contributing latent and active fail-
ures in the accident analysis made the method popular in the ﬁeld
of accident analysis that is vastly used in analysis of civil aviation
accidents (Shappell et al., 2007) as well as the accidents in other
domains like railroad (Reinach and Viale, 2006) and maritime
(Chen and Chou, 2012; Chen et al., 2013). Reinach and Viale
(2006) have further developed the method by adding the ﬁfth
level, namely ‘‘external factors’’, to the initial four levels in order
to cover the latent failures that come from outside a particular
domain. The same practice is followed by recent studies that used
HFACS; see for example (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011; Chauvin
et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2013).
Since every single accident is unique from its own perspective,
frameworks like HFACS try to assign the unique causes of an acci-
dent into more global factors to give better understanding of the
phenomena by cumulating the causes into frequent factors. In this
regard, having a speciﬁc framework with more specialized global
factors for each domain and purposes seems beneﬁcial. The differ-
ent versions of HFACS that are recently introduced in the maritime
domain like HFACS-MA for general maritime accidents (Chen et al.,
2013), HFACS-Coll for collision accidents (Chauvin et al., 2013), and
HFACS-MSS for machinery space accidents (Schröder-Hinrichs
et al., 2011) support this belief. Therefore, we have revised
HFACS to a speciﬁc version suitable for grounding accidents analy-
sis (HFACS-Ground; see Fig. 2) by implementing factors that are
more related to grounding accidents (see also Mazaheri and
Montewka, 2014). HFACS-Ground is also built as a ﬁve-level frame-
work and has many similarities with HFACS-Coll and HFACS-MA.
However, in addition to the factors that cover trafﬁc control and
piloting services as affecting factors on grounding accident, ‘‘infras-
tructure’’ is added as a latent failure subcategory to the ‘‘environ-
mental factors’’ in order to cover the waterway complexity
related issues, like design and markings (Fig. 2 and Table A-1).
These are the factors that are believed to have effect on the fre-
quency of grounding accidents as reported in Mazaheri et al.
(2013a) and Mazaheri et al. (2014a). The accident reports in this
study were then reviewed using this novel framework of
HFACS-Ground, and the results are reported in Section 4.1.
As is mentioned before, in order to avoid subjective
interpretations of the reports, only the factors that were explicitly
mentioned in the reports were extracted and classiﬁed based on
the HFACS-Ground. This basically means that the reviewers
avoided further investigating the causality of the mentioned causes
in the reports up to the higher levels. In total, HFACS-Ground
contains 147 factors that each factor is assigned a nanocode. The
Fig. 2. HFACS-Ground.
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frequency of the causal factors mentioned in the reports.
3.2. Incident reports
In contrary to the accident reports that were prepared in a
systematic analytical way by expert accident investigators, the
incident reports suffer from the lack of a systematic view of the
event. The ForeSea reports are short (from few sentences to maxi-
mum of half a page) and may have been reported by people ofdifferent expertise, thus their qualities depend on the reporters’
skills (Hänninen et al., 2013). The reports of FinnPilot have more
structured keywords, thanks to the preliminary questionnaire each
pilot needs to ﬁll. Although, the actual reports are still short (less
than a page), they have the advantage of containing the expert
analysis of the situation by a certiﬁed mariner. Nevertheless, same
as ForeSea, FinnPilot reports has the high potentiality to be subjec-
tive and biased as the reports are prepared by the same person
who was involved in the event. This has resulted that the reports
have different qualities with regard to the provided data and
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been seen, and only few have tried to hypothesize the proximate
causes of the events. Even those few reports lack the evidence to
support the provided hypotheses. Finnpilot reports also contain
only the factors that the pilot was able to catch during performing
his task, thus they also lack a broad systematic view to the event.
Therefore, using HFACS-Ground for analyzing incident reports is
not practical, rather it might be misleading as normally active fail-
ures are the only causes that are reported in the incident reports.
Therefore, another approach and taxonomy as Safety Factor (SF)
has been followed in this study for reviewing the incident reports.
The SFs are the high level positive functions that are believed to
be prerequisite for safe transport operations. The SFs are initially
drafted by Nisula (2014) and include the (airline) pilot competen-
cies that were produced in the Evidence Based Training (EBT) pro-
ject (IATA, 2013). The SFs are then reﬁned and customized for
maritime purposes within expert panel discussions at the Finnish
Transport Safety Agency (TraFi) as part of an on-going experimen-
tal project at TraFi. The principles for creating the SFs were that
1 – the factors need to be a positive function and not failure condi-
tion or technical device; 2 – the set should cover all high-level
safety critical functions; and 3 – overlap among the SFs should
be avoided (Nisula, 2014). The SFs provide an approximation of
the real system functions and do not go in-depth compared with
other methods like HFACS. Many SFs may depend on each other
and safety is not simply a sum of these factors. Besides, the positive
nature of the SFs as opposed to the failure condition taxonomies
used in methods like HFACS helps the researchers to look for
the measures that were present in the incident scenarios and
presumably stopped the situation to become an accident. These
features of SFs provide a suitable platform with proper taxonomy
for analyzing the incident reports that are not prepared in a
systematic analytical way. For a more comprehensive explanation
on the SFs, the reader is referred to Nisula (2014).
Incident reports in this study are thus reviewed using the SFs
(see Table A-2) to ﬁnd which of the functions presented by SFs
failed, and also if any of the SFs acted as in-place barrier and had
a signiﬁcant role in preventing the escalation of the event. This
way, both positive and negative experiences can be tracked, even
though the SFs are presented as positive functions. The positivity
of the SFs, like ‘‘Controllability of the ship’’, is desirable to detect
the presented safety factors that acted as barriers and stopped
the incident situation to become severe into an accident.
However, for the purpose of analyzing the contributing factors in
the incidents it was necessary to have the negation or failed SFs,
like ‘‘Loss of Controllability of the ship’’. In this way, SFs not only
help us to understand why an incident occurred, but also help us
to ﬁnd what it takes for a serious situation not to become an acci-
dent. The results of reviewing the incident reports are presented in
Section 4.2.3.3. Statistical analysis
To identify any signiﬁcant link between the extracted contribut-
ing factors as well as between SFs from both types of the reports,
the statistical dependencies of the factors are studied two-by-
two using Pearson correlation coefﬁcient (r). The signiﬁcance of
the correlation is tested by computing the p-values using
Student-t distribution. The Spearman rank coefﬁcient (q) is also
used to study the rank relation between the frequencies of the
extracted factors from the accident and incident reports. The
results of the statistical analysis are used in Section 4.3.1 to com-
pare acquired knowledge from the accident and incident reports
as well as to brieﬂy discuss the interrelation between some of
the extracted contributing factors from the reports (see Fig. 1).4. Results
4.1. Accident reports
Table 1 shows the results of the reviewing of the accident
reports as the relative frequency of each class of factors. The rela-
tive frequency shows the occurrence frequency of a speciﬁc class of
factors in the reports in relation to the occurrence frequency of all
the other factors in each layer (see Fig. 2). It can be seen that levels
1 and 2 of the failures as unsafe acts and preconditions are seen
more frequently in the accident reports. Level 5 of failure as the
external factors has the smallest frequency. Level 2 of failure as
preconditions has the highest frequency among other levels of fail-
ures, which may be the result of having the largest coverage of the
factors. From among the 147 causal factors that HFACS-Ground
covers, 88 factors belong to this level.
Table 1 also shows that ‘‘judgment/decision errors’’ is the most
frequent active failure. When this is seen together with the most
frequent latent failure, as issues related to coordination/com-
munication/planning, one may see the importance of the proper
planning and communication, as most of the errors may be avoided
as a result of that. Although this is an interrelation (i.e. causality)
issue that needs to be further studied, we have discussed a bit fur-
ther on this issue using the results of the correlation analysis in
Section 4.3.1.
Moreover, Table 1 shows that the most frequent failures are
among the two ﬁrst levels of failures in HFACS-Ground framework.
Since these two ﬁrst levels of failures are mostly related to the fail-
ures of the frontline operators, this shows that: either the reviewed
accident reports somehow failed to further investigate the top tier
causes as organizational, supervisional, and external factors; or those
preconditions may have been less involved in the causality net-
work of the accidents. If the ﬁrst conclusion is true, then there is
the risk that the recommendations that are made based on these
investigations may not be able to tackle the actual problem.4.2. Incident reports
As is mentioned before, the SFs are phrased as positive func-
tions, e.g. ‘‘Controllability of the ship’’, which is desirable to detect
the presented safety factors that acted as barriers and stopped the
incident situation to become severe into an accident. However, for
the purpose of analyzing the contributing factors in the incidents
as well as comparing the incident and accident events with each
other, it was necessary to have the negation of SFs, e.g. ‘‘Loss of
Controllability of the ship’’. Therefore, the incident reports are
reviewed to simultaneously ﬁnd those SFs that were reported pre-
sent in the event as barriers and also to ﬁnd if the absence or fail-
ure of any SFs contributed to the occurrence of the event. This
means that not only the SFs are collected as safety barriers (Pos.
columns in Tables 2 and A-2) but also the negations of SFs are col-
lected as contributing factors (Neg. columns in Tables 2 and A-2) in
the incidents.
Table 3 shows the summary of the results of the reviewing of
the incident reports as the relative frequency of each SF, which is
the occurrence frequency of a SF or its negation in relation to the
occurrence frequency of all the other SFs. The complete results of
the reviewing of the incident reports are presented in Table A-2
in Appendix. Table 2 shows that the most contributing factors into
the occurred incident were the absence or failure of the
Fundamental and External Safety Factors. Looking into the details
of the SF categories (Table A-2) one can see that the problems with
the propulsion systems as well as the pilotage related problems
were the most frequent contributing factors in the reviewed inci-
dents (Fig. 3). The effective SFs that acted as barriers also belong
Table 1
Analyzing the accident reports using HFACS-Ground.
Level 1st Layer % 2nd Layer % 3rd Layer % Rank
Active Failure 1 Unsafe Acts 27.6 Error 83.3 Skill-based 34 4
Judgment/Decision 56 2
Perceptional 10 10
Violation 16.7 Routine 57.8 8
Exceptional 42.2 11
Latent Failure/Condition 2 Preconditions 49.1 Environmental Factors 40.7 Physical environment 37.9 5
Technological environment 41 3
Infrastructures 21.1 6
Condition of Operator 16.9 Cognitive factors 34.3 7
Psycho-behavioral factors 30.3 9
Adverse physiological states 22.9 12
Physical/Mental limitations 9.8 14
Perceptual factors 2.7 15
Personal Factors 42.4 Coordination/Communication/Planning 93.7 1
Personal readiness 6.3 13
3 Unsafe supervision 8.5 Inadequate supervision 52.7 18
Planned inappropriate operations 20.3 20
Failed to correct known problems 15 22
Supervisory violations 12 23
4 Organizational inﬂuence 12 Resource management 41.2 17
Organizational climate 13.1 21
Organizational process 45.7 16
5 External factors 2.8 Regulation gaps 15.9 24
Other factors 84.1 19
Table 2
Summary of the incident reports analysis using the deﬁned Safety Factors. See Table A-2 in Appendix for the details. The columns ‘‘Pos’’ present the positive Safety Factors as
safety barriers. The columns ‘‘Neg’’ present the negation of Safety Factors as contributing factors in the incidents. The column ‘‘Total’’ represents the cumulative frequency of both
data sources using equal weights.
Categories of Safety Factors Finnpilot (%) ForeSea (%) Total (%)
Pos Neg Pos Neg Pos Neg
Fundamental safety factors 1.8 8.9 31.1 56.0 10.8 28.9
Competencies with respect to different crew categories 31.3 15.6 29.7 9.0 30.8 12.8
Knowing and respecting operational limitations 0.0 2.2 1.4 1.0 0.4 1.7
Fitness for work 0.0 0.0 8.1 1.0 2.5 0.4
Procedures practices and culture 28.3 8.9 0.0 7.0 19.6 8.1
Ergonomics and redundancy 0.0 3.0 1.4 3.0 0.4 3.0
Availability of timely and reliable information 1.8 5.2 0.0 6.0 1.3 5.5
External safety factors 36.7 56.3 28.4 17.0 34.2 39.6
Table 3
Frequency of the extracted causes from the incident reports of Foresea and Finnpilot in compare with the extracted causes from the accident reports.
General categories Incident reports (%) Accident reports (%)
ForeSea Finnpilot Total
Accidental loss of control 9.0 0.0 4.4 0.8
Alarm missing or not clear 0.6 0.0 0.3 4.0
Bad visibility 0.6 0.0 0.3 3.3
Darkness 0.6 0.0 0.3 1.7
Errors (skill-based/judgment/decision) 10.2 3.5 6.8 8.9
Fairway 4.2 2.9 3.6 4.1
Hazardous natural environment 2.4 7.6 5.1 5.2
Inappropriate communication and cooperation 0.6 4.1 2.4 10.3
Inappropriate maintenance 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.6
Inappropriate regulations and practices 9.0 31.8 20.5 7.9
Inappropriate route planning 0.0 1.8 0.9 6.5
Inappropriate ship/bridge system design or equipment 3.6 2.9 3.3 3.8
Inappropriate training 5.4 0.6 2.9 5.1
Lack of redundancy 7.8 0.6 4.1 1.0
Lack of situational awareness 0.6 0.0 0.3 3.0
Mechanical failure or unexpected behavior 32.9 7.6 20.1 3.5
Organizational factors and support 5.4 32.9 19.4 7.0
Other personal factors 1.2 1.2 1.2 6.2
Ship moving off course 0.6 0.0 0.3 3.7
Trafﬁc 2.4 0.0 1.2 0.6
Under-manning of necessary stations 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6
Violation of good seamanship practices 0.6 2.4 1.5 7.0
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the detail categories of the SFs (see Table A-2) shows that manage-
ability of the external weather conditions as well as the readiness
of the crew regarding the upcoming demanding situation have
helped the crew to manage the facing threats safely (Fig. 3).
Moreover, going to each group of incident reports separately
(i.e. ForeSea and Finnpilot), some patterns can be seen that most
probably rooted into the way that the reports are prepared. The
most frequent contributing factor related to the incidents reported
of ForeSea is the unavailability of propulsion, while for the reports
of the Finnpilot is pilotage related factors (see Table A-2). Since
ForeSea incident reports are prepared voluntarily by the person
who was involved in the incident, this may be the sign that people
tend to mostly see the technological failures as the cause of a mis-
hap rather than the human related factors. Contradictory, the
reports of the Finnpilot, which are also prepared by the pilot
who was involved in the incident shows that the pilotage related
difﬁculties and problems, which is a human related factor, is the
dominant contributing factor into the incidents. One possible
reason for this contradiction might be that, unlike the ForeSea inci-
dent reports, the reported incidents by Finnpilot are the mandatory
reports requested by the company that need to be prepared right
after each incident. Besides, Finnpilot reports are the incidents that
at least two independent parties were involved (i.e. the pilot for
the pilotage company and the crew for the shipping company).Fig. 3. The most frequent safety barriers (Greens; Positive SF) and coThus, more clear and informative reports are naturally prepared
as there were at least two independent witnesses (i.e. sources of
information). Moreover, although the ForeSea reports also have
the purpose of informing the maritime community about the pos-
sible threats, the Finnpilot reports are internal reports requested
by the company that has more clear purposes for the reports, i.e.
enhancing the piloting services offered by the company. This
may show the weakness of the voluntary reports in compare with
the mandatory reports, to be used as a reliable source of informa-
tion for usages other than enhancing the safety awareness through
the maritime society.
4.3. Comparison of incidents and accidents
Since the accident and incident reports are reviewed with dif-
ferent approaches, in order to be able to compare the extracted
knowledge from them we transferred the results of the accident
and incident reports into a common terminology, using general
categories that are based on failure terminology. Categories from
Rothblum (2000) and McCafferty and Baker (2006) are used as
guidelines in building the general categories for this part. Since
having ﬁxed categories may result information loss and thus
introduce uncertainty (Hänninen et al., 2013), a dynamic category
deﬁnition, in where the categories change during the process is
implemented. The process was both iterative and collective;ntributing factors (Reds; Negated SF) in the reviewed incidents.
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reports were in hand, they were assigned to some pre-created cate-
gories. In case that some contributing factors cannot be ﬁt to an
existing category or a change to the taxonomy of an existing cate-
gory is needed in order to accommodate a contributing factor, a
new category is created. When a new category is created, all the
contributing factors are checked again to see if the new category
can be a better ﬁt for any of the previously assigned contributing
factors.
The results of this process for both accident and incident reports
are shown in Table 3. As mentioned before, it can be seen that
mechanical failure or unexpected behavior of equipment by far is
the most frequent mishap category that is reported by ForeSea
incident reports. The next category, which stands second to
mechanical failure by a distance, is errors. Knowing that ForeSea
incident reports are voluntary reports written mostly by the per-
son who was involved in the incident, this may be the sign that
people tend to mostly see the technological failures as the cause
of a mishap rather than a human element. Although ‘‘errors’’ comes
next in the list, all the errors reported in the reviewed ForeSea
reports were errors made by a person other than the reporter
and most of them were people out of the circle of the crew, like
port operators or an individual in a third company. Only one report
contained an error made by a crew member, which was reported
by his superior as the cause of the mishap. This may show that
despite of the existing oppose discussions for the blame culture
(see for example Russell, 1999 and Bond, 2008) this culture is still
alive in the mind of mariners that makes them hesitate to either
see or report the mistakes made by themselves or their close
colleagues. This could be seen as another reason that why
voluntary-based reports in their current format are not reliable
to be used for evidence-based risk modeling.
Looking at the most frequent factors from the Finnpilot reports,
inappropriate regulations and organizational factors come ﬁrst in the
list. Those are mostly related to the difﬁculties in the performed
pilotage tasks, when for example pilot either embarked after the
pilot boarding position or disembarked before that, because the
rules in these issues are not clear. Although they are mostly justi-
ﬁed (e.g. due to the weather condition), it can be seen that the
pilots reported them as threats for safety. This threat was also
spotted as a contributing factor for some of the accidents in the
reviewed SIAF reports. Same as the Finnish pilots, the SIAF accident
investigators were pointing out the generality and ambiguity of the
regulations regarding the pilotage practices either by the maritime
authorities or the ship operating companies as a threat for safety.
4.3.1. Statistical analysis
The Spearman rank correlation between the rank orders of
contributing factors for accident and total incident reports
(Table 3), which shows the difference between the most frequent
causes in the accident and incident reports, is weak in general
(q  0.3). Nevertheless, the rank correlation changes signiﬁcantly
if we do the test for accident reports and each source of incident
reports (i.e. Finnpilot and ForeSea) separately. The rank correlation
between accident reports and the Finnpilot incident reports shows
quite strong correlation (q  0.6, p < 0.05), while the same test
with ForeSea database is absolutely weak (q  0.07). This
difference may be interpreted in two ways. The ﬁrst interpretation
comes from the way that the reports are prepared. Since a
systematic approach is followed for the accident reports, they
may be considered more reliable with regard to the presented
knowledge. Thus, the difference between the rank order of the
important contributing factors in accident and incidents reports
may be a good criterion to examine the reliability of the incident
data sources. Therefore and based on the assumed criterion, we
may conclude that the involved uncertainties in the voluntaryincident reports of ForeSea are high that make the reports almost
unreliable to be used as such in evidence-based risk modeling.
Thus, unless the current way of investigating and voluntary report-
ing the incidents are changed, the reports may only be useful in the
way that they are being used nowadays, meaning acting as alerts of
the possible threats in the working places or increasing the safety
awareness among the mariners. On the contrary, the Finnpilot
mandatory incident reports and the embedded information can
be considered reliable enough to be utilized in evidence-based risk
modeling.
The second interpretation comes from the idea that the inci-
dents are incomplete chains of events toward an actual accident.
This means that the more in deep parallel analysis of accident
and incident reports may reveal the possible risk control options
that were in place to stop the incident to become an accident.
For instance, although errors has the second rank in frequency in
both types of reports (see Table 3), based on the frequency of
inappropriate communication and cooperation in the accident and
incident reports, we may conclude that ‘‘appropriate communica-
tion and cooperation’’ in the incident cases stopped the situation
to become serious, and thus highlighting the importance of a
proper interaction between the crew. This conclusion can be con-
ﬁrmed at some level by the statistical results of the study (see
Fig. 4A). Finnpilot incident reports show that the inappropriate
communication and cooperation will interrupt the ﬂow of informa-
tion (i.e. availability of timely and reliable information/aboard the
ship; see Table A-2) between the crew (r = 0.6, p < 0.01), which
then will increase the likelihood of errors. In such cases, the skills
and knowledge of a pilot (i.e. External Safety Factor/Pilotage; see
Table A-2) may compensate this ﬂaw (r = 0.6, p < 0.01) and acts
as a safety barrier. Moreover, inappropriate communication and
cooperation is linked to inappropriate route planning (r = 0.5,
p < 0.05) in the accidents. The importance of appropriate route
planning, itself, can be understood by the link that it has with pres-
ence of a pilot (r = 0.5, p < 0.05) in accident cases, knowing that in
about 40% of the reviewed grounding accident reports a licensed
pilot was present onboard the vessel. However, Finnpilot reports
show that when the pilotage does not go as is planned, in a favor-
able environmental condition and good visibility (i.e. External
Safety Factors/Manageability of threats related to conditions; see
Table A-2) the awareness of the crew on the bridge can save the
day by recognizing the error on time (r = 0.9, p < 0.01). It is worth
to mentioned that there is also a strong link between inappropriate
communication and personal factors (r = 0.7, p < 0.01) in incident
reports in general, which may show how personality of crew
affects the safety through inappropriate communication.
The results also show that the lack of redundancy could be an
affecting factor in safety as it is reported in about 4% of the incident
cases and shows a strong link with the accidental loss of control
(r = 0.8, p < 0.01) in the accidents (see Fig. 4B). The results of the
accident cases show that the accidental loss of control, itself, can
be affected by the inappropriate training (r = 0.8, p < 0.01) and
the inappropriate maintenance through technical failures (r = 0.7,
p < 0.05).
Under-manning, which is reported by almost 6% of the accident
cases, shows strong connection with inappropriate regulation and
practices (r = 0.6, p < 0.01), which is presented in both incident
(21%) and accident (8%) cases (see Fig. 4C). This then illustrates
the importance of proper policies and training, especially in human
resource management, in the maritime safety.5. Discussion
The results show that the most frequent active failure con-
tributed in the reviewed grounding accidents is the operators’
Fig. 4. Interrelations between some of the contributing factors in grounding events supported by the extracted knowledge from the accident and incident reports. The links
are supported by the Pearson coefﬁcients, while the directions of the links are direct logical extraction from the reports.
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in both accident and incident reports (Table 3). Combining this
knowledge with the high frequency of inappropriate communica-
tion and cooperation in accidents and the low frequency of the
same factor in incident reports (Table 3), the importance of proper
interaction between the crew members may be highlighted. Most
of the operators’ errors may be detected and avoided on time
through proper monitoring and checking, which is the result of a
proper communication and cooperation (Fig. 4A). Moreover, sta-
tistical analysis of the extracted causes in accident and incident
reports suggests that inappropriate planning is an important factor
affecting safety with regard to the grounding accident (Fig. 4A). The
results show that inappropriate planning can affect maritime
safety as it may even cancel out the presence of a licensed local
pilot onboard.
Most of the detected contributing factors in the reviewed acci-
dent reports belong to the ﬁrst and second levels of failures in
Fig. 2, which is mostly related to the operator’s failure. This may
be the sign that either the current frameworks that are used for
analyzing the accident reports are not proper for detecting the
upper level failures (level 3 upwards in Fig. 2), or upper level fail-
ures were not highly involved in the studied accidents. This may be
interpreted in two ways. A more conservative interpretation is that
active and latent failures of the frontline operators are the most
responsible failures for grounding accidents; which then suggests
the need for causality analysis of these failures in order to be able
to implement proper control measures. Another interpretation,
could be that the used frameworks for the accident analysis by
MAIB and SIAF are not capable of deep analyzing an accident up
to the higher levels of failures; which then suggests the use of amore proper and updated framework for the investigations. It is
worth mentioning that in none of the reviewed accident reports
HFACS has been used as the framework for investigation.
Therefore, since the presented knowledge in each report is affected
by the framework that is used for investigating the accident
(Lundberg et al., 2009), our study shows that the use of a different
framework to review the reports does not have much effect on the
knowledge that can be acquired.
The analysis of the reviewed incident reports shows that the
current practice of voluntary reporting the near-misses cannot
contribute much on evidence-based risk modeling; because they
only highlight active failures as the contributing factors in the
occurred mishap. Besides, such incident reports have the tendency
to overlook the mishaps related to organizations and operators,
and emphasize more on technology failures. This is either because
the reports are not prepared based on a holistic investigation and
only the observations are reported; or that the blame culture is still
highlighted in the minds of the crew that even in an anonymous
report they hesitate to report other causes than technology fail-
ures. This may be seen as a problem of the voluntary near-miss
report systems, as it makes the incident reports to be unreliable
with regard to detecting the signiﬁcant causes of an accident that
can be used in evidence-based risk modeling. However, the
mandatory incident report system that is carried out by the com-
panies and for their own purposes has better potential to be used
for evidence-based risk modeling, speciﬁcally if more than one
party is involved in the event. Although still suffer from the lack
of a systematic view, such reports are considered more reliable
with regard to the presented information and thus more consistent
source for evidence-based risk modeling as it seems the blame
A. Mazaheri et al. / Safety Science 76 (2015) 202–214 211culture has no effect on such reports. For instance, the study of the
Finnpilot reports that are prepared by the pilots themselves shows
that the difﬁculties and problems during the pilotage are responsi-
ble for the incidents in more than 38% of the cases.
Moreover, since incidents can be seen as broken chain of haz-
ardous events that did not end in an accident, if the current prac-
tice of reporting near-misses is changed into a more systematic
way of analysis, these reports may be used in evidence-based risk
modeling in combination with accident reports in order to ﬁnd
proper safety barriers and control options. One does not have much
to say with regard to the possible controlling options only by
knowing about the most frequent causes. Effective control options
can be deﬁned and implemented only if the interrelations between
the contributing factors are known. The interrelations between the
factors were not studied in this paper as such; however the study
shows that the statistical analysis on the frequency of the causes
may give hints regarding the causal relations between the
extracted causes (see Fig. 4). Analysis of causal relations may tell
why a mishap like inappropriate communication has occurred.
For instance, we have found that the causes recognized by the
investigators for inappropriate communication and cooperation
in the bridge were different like:
 High gradient authority of the master due to his age or years of
experience.
 Lack of guidelines from the shipping or piloting companies
regarding the cooperation and communication in different
situations.
 Over-trust to one’s knowledge and maneuvering skills.
 Established faulty practices like seeing piloting as a one-man job.Table A-1
Description of the HFACS-Ground categeroies.
Causal category Description
Skill-based error Errors occur in the operator’s execution of a routin
Judgment/Decision error Actions of an individual performed as intended but t
Perceptional error Misperception of an object, threat, or situation tha
Routine violation Actions of the operator that happen in a regular ba
Exceptional violation When the operator intentionally violates procedure
individual
Physical environment Environmental phenomena such as weather and cl
Technological environment Design of the workspace or failure of an automatio
Mechanical failure or breakage of equipment that i
Infrastructures Design of the waterway/fairway or markings/nav-ai
pilot boarding places for the area is also included
Cognitive factors Cognitive conditions affect the perception or perfor
Psycho-behavioral factors Individual’s personality traits, psychosocial problem
situation
Adverse physiological states Physiologic event that decreases performance of an
Physical/mental limitations Individual lacks the physical or mental capabilities
Perceptual factors Misperception of an object, threat, or situation crea
Coordination, Communication,
Planning
Inadequate interactions among individuals, crews,
that resulted in an unsafe situation. It includes ina
functionality of operators and results in an unsafe
Personal readiness Individual shows disregarding of rules and instruct
comes to readiness to perform the mission
Inadequate supervision Supervision is inappropriate or improper, and fails
results in an unsafe situation
Planned inappropriate
operations
Supervision fails to adequately assess the hazards a
to participate in missions beyond their capabilities
Failed to correct known
problems
Supervision fails to correct known deﬁciencies in d
actions of individuals
Supervisory violations Supervision willfully disregards instructions, guida
Resource management Resource management or acquisition processes or
management or creates an unsafe situation
Organizational climate Organizational environment, structure, policies, an
Organizational process Organizational operations and procedures negative
an unsafe situation
Regulation gaps International or national regulations, laws, or polic
the operator
Other factors Decisions, actions, or products from outside the or
actions of the operatorThis variation in the reasoning of a single cause shows the dif-
ﬁculty of addressing causality issues, as each needs different
approaches to be addressed.
Additionally, the majority of the reviewed near-miss grounding
cases from ForeSea were categorized into near-miss groundings
because a mechanical problem, like steering malfunction, could
have led to the possible loses of maneuverability. Therefore,
near-miss grounding cases that are extracted from the ForeSea
database may not be precisely a near-miss accident from our per-
spective. This again also shows that the incident databases should
be used cautiously in evidence-based risk modeling, as the near-
miss deﬁnition of an accident may differ with the one that is used
in such databases. Besides, by looking at the frequencies in the
incident reports, some level of subjectivity in the reports may be
recognizable. The Finnpilot reports mostly highlights the causes
that are more important for the pilots, and the ForeSea reports
may have some level of underreporting of human elements. This
may question the reliability of the near-miss reports in general
for detecting the contributing factors in accident modeling.
Despite the above discussions, the study is bounded with the
involved uncertainties. Use of speciﬁc databases to extract
the reports may introduce some level of uncertainty that roots to
the way that the databases are formulated. Thus, the study needs
to be repeated using reports prepared by other authorities and data
providers. Besides, although it has been tried to not further
investigate the events to avoid subjectivity when the reports are
reviewed, still some level of subjectivity by the reviewers of the
reports may be introduced into the extracted knowledge as
uncertainty. However, this subjectivity is considered as not very
signiﬁcant (Hyttinen, 2013; Hyttinen et al., 2014).e and practiced task relating to procedure, training or proﬁciency
he chosen action was inadequate or wrong that did not end to a desired end-state
t causes a human error
ses as deliberately disregarding rules and instructions
s or policies without need. This mostly happens due to lack of discipline of an
imate affect the actions of individuals and result in an unsafe situation
n system affect the actions of individuals and result in an unsafe situation.
s necessary for ship handling is included
ds are inadequate and create an unsafe situation. The availability and adequacy of
mance of individuals and result in an unsafe situation
s, psychological disorders, or inappropriate motivation creates an unsafe
individual and results in an unsafe situation
to cope with a situation, which causes an unsafe situation
tes an unsafe situation
and teams involved with the preparation, planning, and execution of a mission
ppropriate or inadequate ship and bridge resource management that affects the
situation
ions that govern the individuals readiness, or exhibits poor judgment when it
to identify hazard, recognize and control risk, provide guidance and training that
ssociated with an operation, or allows non-proﬁcient or inexperienced personnel
ocuments, processes or procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or unsafe
nce, rules, or operating instructions
policies, directly or indirectly, inﬂuence system safety and results in poor error
d culture inﬂuence individual actions and results in an unsafe situation
ly inﬂuence individual, supervisory, or organizational performance and result in
ies inﬂuence system safety and results in poor management or unsafe actions of
ganization inﬂuence system safety and result in poor management or unsafe
Table A-2
Details of the Safety Factors and their presence and absence in the incident reports.
The columns ‘‘Pos’’ present the positive Safety Factors as safety barriers. The columns
‘‘Neg’’ present the negation of Safety Factors as contributing factors in the incidents.
Deﬁned Safety Factors Finnpilot
(%)
ForeSea (%)
Fundamental safety factors Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg.
Availability of propulsion 0.0 3.7 0.0 41.0
Awareness of ship position in relation to the
correct safe route
0.0 3.7 0.0 5.0
Capability to evacuate (escape routes,
equipment, emergency communications)
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capability to maintain survivable conditions
aboard ship
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capability to stop ship and sea-keeping ability 1.8 0.0 10.8 1.0
Controllability of ship stability 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Maneuverability 0.0 1.5 2.7 8.0
Structural integrity and damage stability 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.0
Technical redundancy 0.0 0.0 5.4 1.0
Competencies with respect to different crew categories
Application of procedures and knowledge 2.4 0.7 9.5 4.0
Communication 3.0 2.2 0.0 1.0
Knowledge 6.6 1.5 0.0 2.0
Leadership and teamwork 0.6 3.0 5.4 0.0
Management of ship’s route and related
automation/equipment
3.0 4.4 0.0 1.0
Manual steering of ship 3.0 3.0 1.4 0.0
Problem-solving and decision-making 3.0 0.0 8.1 0.0
Ship maneuvering in port 2.4 0.7 0.0 0.0
Situation awareness (including anticipation) 7.2 0.0 5.4 1.0
Workload management 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Knowing and respecting operational limitations
Limitations concerning the route, speeds, etc. 0.0 2.2 1.4 1.0
Shipload planning and loading: stowage,
appreciation of cargo characteristics, volume
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Fitness for work
Psycho-physical performance level 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Vigilance level 0.0 0.0 8.1 0.0
Procedures practices and culture
Adapted to real operational situations 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Adequate focus on safety in the presence of
commercial pressures
0.0 3.7 0.0 6.0
Anticipating demanding operations and
situations
28.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Managing a multitude of cultures (and
languages)
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Operational planning 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0
Quality and clarity 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0
Ergonomics and redundancy
Adequate redundancy within the crew (deck
ofﬁcers)
0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0
Ergonomics in how information is presented 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0
Usability of bridge automation (ergonomics, HCI) 0.0 2.2 0.0 3.0
Availability of timely and reliable information
Aboard ship 1.2 2.2 0.0 0.0
Between the ship and the external world 0.6 3.0 0.0 6.0
External safety factors
Icebreaker assistance 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Manageability of exceptional phenomena and
situations (e.g. icebergs, pirates)
0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
Manageability of external threats (e.g. restricted
waters, fairways, infrastructure)
0.0 1.5 14.9 7.0
Manageability of threats caused by other vessels 0.0 0.0 8.1 3.0
Manageability of threats related to conditions
(e.g. weather, visibility, ice, currents)
27.7 9.6 1.4 3.0
Pilotage 6.0 38.5 4.1 1.0
Port operations 0.0 3.7 0.0 1.0
Towage 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.0
VTS operations 2.4 2.2 0.0 0.0
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The possibility of using accident and incident reports in evi-
dence-based risk modeling is investigated using accident reports
prepared by Finnish and British accident investigation boards
(SIAF and MAIB) as well as ForeSea and FinnPilot incident data-
bases with regard to grounding cases. A version of HFACS frame-
work as HFACS-Ground is introduced to review the grounding
accident reports, and the concept of Safety Factors as high level
positive functions that are prerequisite for safe transport
operations is used for reviewing the incident reports. In conclusion,
accident reports are seen as a reliable source of evidence to extract
the most signiﬁcant contributing factors in grounding accidents.
Nevertheless, their reliability will be better conﬁrmed if their
usability for extracting the interrelation between the contributing
factors is also tested in future studies. On the other hand, voluntary
incident reports are shown as not very useful or reliable in their
current form for evidence-based risk modeling, while the manda-
tory incident reports are in a better position in that respect. The
voluntary reports may only be useful in the way that they are cur-
rently used, as the alerts for possible hazards in the daily operation
of shipping. In general, in order to make the incident reports useful
for accident modeling, ﬁrst they need to be prepared in a more
systematic way that can address the causality of the mishaps,
and second a more consistent deﬁnition of near-miss situation
needs to be deﬁned to reliably assign occurred mishaps to a
speciﬁc type of accident.
Moreover, the results of this study as the extracted frequent
contributing factors in grounding accidents as well as the
detected interrelations between some of those contributing fac-
tors can be used for structuring a risk model for grounding acci-
dent. Since the results of this study are based on the actual
accident and incident cases (i.e. real scenarios), the model that
is structured using these results can be considered as an evi-
dence-based risk model. Such model, as discussed shortly in
the Introduction section and more comprehensively in
Mazaheri et al. (2014b), is suitable for risk management
purposes as it reﬂects the background available knowledge on
the system and its components.
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Table A-3
Description of the categories used for comparing the incident and accident reports.
General categories Description
Accidental loss of control Losing the maneuvering control of the vessel
in a hazardous situation by any other reason
than a mechanical failure
Alarm missing or not clear An error or a dangerous situation does not
have an assigned alarm; or the alarm was not
clear enough for the crew to make them
aware of the danger
Bad visibility Poor visibility due to e.g. fog or snow that
affects the visual or radar visibility
Darkness No natural light outside (moon or sun)
Errors (Skill-based/Judgment/
Decision)
Errors occur in the operator’s execution of a
task or in the chosen action or in the made
decision
Fairway The design of the fairway made it hard to
navigate, or inadequate markings in the
fairway
Hazardous natural
environment
Natural environmental phenomena such as
weather and climate creates hazardous
situation to perform the mission
Inappropriate
communication and
cooperation
Inadequate interactions between the crew on
the bridge/engine room
Inappropriate maintenance Inappropriate routine maintenance of the
vital equipment causes an unsafe situation
Inappropriate regulations and
practices
Inappropriate or no speciﬁc regulations for
speciﬁc or normal situation (onboard) by the
company or the authorities that cause an
unsafe situation
Inappropriate route planning A route plan is not prepared or is prepared
inadequately by the master or the pilot for
the intended voyage
Inappropriate ship/bridge
system design or
equipment
The ergonomic design of the working space
or other equipment involved in the ship
navigation/steering is inappropriate and
causes human error or unsafe situation
Inappropriate training The crew has not received proper training
necessary to do their jobs in normal or
emergency situations
Lack of redundancy Inappropriate or no backup system is placed
for the equipment that is vital for safely
performing the mission
Lack of situational awareness Individual is uncertain or unaware of what is
happening around him/her e.g. weather
conditions and trafﬁc. This includes the
uncertainty about the location of the vessel
Mechanical failure or
unexpected behavior
Failure of the vital equipment like
navigation/steering systems or unexpected
behavior of the equipment that causes
unsafe situation
Organizational factors and
support
Inappropriate support from the responsible
organization or lack of proper regulations/
instructions. This also includes receiving
inappropriate support from the responsible
organization in emergency situation that
causes an unsafe situation or a human error
Other personal factors Physiological, physical, mental and
behavioral state of an individual like fatigue,
intoxication, distraction, panic, stress, and
hurry
Ship moving off course Not being in the planned route or the
waterway causes an unsafe situation
Trafﬁc Nearby or on route trafﬁc causes an unsafe
situation
Under-manning of necessary
stations
Given the situation, there is not enough crew
on one or more vital positions such as the
engine room, bridge, and lookout, which
causes task accumulation on an individual or
creates an unsafe situation
Violation of good seamanship
practices
Any other deviation from the routine
seamanship practices that makes an
individual take unnecessary risk and cause
human error or unsafe situation
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